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This essay explores the ways that Western economic support for Tibetan exile monasteries in South Asia stimulates (1) the exodus of 
young males from the Buddhist highlands of Nepal, 
and (2) the homogenization of diverse religious 
practices in those same areas. I argue that the attempt 
to “preserve” Tibetan culture by supporting monks 
and monasteries has unanticipated consequences that 
reverberate beyond the point of articulation between 
patrons and priests. The resultant processes of 
culture change are veiled by a persistent assumption 
about the nature of Tibetan societies, namely, that 
Tibetan culture ﬁnds its expression ﬁrst and foremost 
in monastic Buddhism, and that anything that does 
not ﬁt the normative mold represents degeneration 
from a pristine cultural template (see Ramble 1993). 
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CULTURE CHANGE IN THE NAME OF 
CULTURAL PRESERVATION1
My argument relates to Shneiderman’s observation 
that “more static notions of religious identities” 
are being encouraged throughout the highlands of 
Nepal by “extra-local entities” (e.g., Tibetan exile 
monasteries, foreign charitable organizations, and 
state governments), resulting in “shifts in local 
notions of religious authority” (Shneiderman n.d.). 
At the core of this essay are two interrelated argu-
ments, one demographic and one cultural. The de-
mographic argument begins by noting that money 
provided by Western donors to support Tibetan 
rinpoches (“precious one”, a title of respect for an 
esteemed lama) has resulted in a proliferation of 
monasteries in exile. Meanwhile, the decline of fer-
tility among Tibetan refugees has prompted these 
resurrected institutions to look for new sources of 
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The resultant 
processes of culture 
change are veiled 
by a persistent 
assumption…that 
Tibetan culture 
ﬁnds its expression 
ﬁrst and foremost in 
monastic Buddhism, 
and that anything 
that does not ﬁt the 
normative mold 
represents degenera-
tion from a pristine 
cultural template. 
“
”
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recruits. The ethnically Tibetan, religiously Buddhist, high 
fertility highlands of Nepal has emerged as their primary 
recruiting ground. The cultural argument considers the 
ramiﬁcations of these new migration patterns. Some indi-
viduals from Nepal’s highlands who receive training in the 
exile monasteries subsequently become catalysts for culture 
change; returning to their natal villages, they encounter reli-
gious systems that differ from the 
ones they were trained in, and set 
out to rectify matters. In short, the 
working hypotheses for this essay 
are the following:
Hypothesis 1: The recent pro-
liferation of exile monasteries, 
supported in part by foreign 
patrons, has increased the de-
mand for monks. The rapid 
fertility decline among Tibetan 
exiles has stimulated the inten-
siﬁcation of recruitment efforts 
in Nepal’s Buddhist highlands, 
resulting in an unprecedented 
level of out-migration of young 
males.
Hypothesis 2: The goal of pre-
serving Tibetan culture is a 
rationale for Westerners to sup-
port Tibetan exile monasteries. 
An unintended consequence 
of foreign patronage for these 
monasteries is the loss of cul-
tural diversity in the ethnically 
Tibetan, Buddhist highlands of 
Nepal. 
This is not the ﬁrst study to ex-
amine the interactions between 
Tibetan Buddhists and Western disciples (e.g., Batchelor 
1994; Lopez 1998; Prebish and Baumann 2002; Moran 
2004, Zablocki 2005). My own approach to this topic di-
verges from other studies of “transnational Buddhism” (1) by 
concentrating on cultural changes that occur in places far 
removed from the points of contact between Westerners and 
their Tibetan Buddhists, and (2) by examining the interac-
tions between the transnational ﬂow of charitable giving and 
demographic trends.
The social impacts that Western economic systems have 
on local communities is an important topic in the social sci-
ences. Several decades ago critics of modernization theory 
posited that so-called “traditional societies” (those character-
ized by their isolation, impoverishment, and adherence to 
customs) were in fact created through marginalization; that 
is, they are by-products of capitalism and colonialism (Frank 
1967; Wallerstein 1979). Anthropologists working from the 
perspective of political economy contributed important stud-
ies about changes instigated when local communities become 
integrated into a global, capitalist market system (e.g., Wolf 
1982). A derivative of this research is the current focus on 
“globalization” (Eriksen 2003; Trouillot 2003). Although def-
initions of this concept vary across disciplines and according 
to theoretical interests, one that is 
particularly succinct and useful for 
the purpose of this essay is the fol-
lowing: “Contemporary globaliza-
tion is the increasing ﬂow of trade, 
ﬁnance, culture, ideas, and people 
brought about by the sophisticated 
technology of communications and 
travel by the worldwide spread of 
neoliberal capitalism, and it is the 
local and regional adaptations to 
and resistance against these ﬂows” 
(Lewellen 2002).
 Lewellen’s deﬁnition is used 
here as a starting point to sort out 
the local and regional adaptations 
resulting from the ﬂows of capi-
tal between Westerners and exile 
monasteries, albeit in this case the 
focus is on charitable giving rather 
than on the spread of capitalism. 
Modern communications and the 
relative ease of international travel 
help facilitate the ﬂow of capital 
between Western patrons and 
their Tibetan lamas. Gone are the 
days when disciples had to journey 
to the East to meet their mentors. 
Nowadays some rinpoches live 
more or less permanently in the West; many of their dis-
ciples have never set foot in Nepal, India, or Tibet. Modern 
communications diminish the distance between students 
and teachers. I recall sitting with a rinpoche in Kathmandu 
when a disciple called his cell phone from the U.S. to discuss 
a bad dream and other obstacles to his meditation practice. 
The internet also eases the dissemination of information 
across the globe. Travel and teaching schedules of rinpoches 
are regularly posted on sites associated with Buddhist orga-
nizations. A cursory Google search uncovered itineraries for 
more than twenty different lamas who will travel from South 
Asia to the U.S. during the summer of 2005. The increasing 
frequency and intensity of international contacts has made 
it easier than ever for lamas to relay their requests to foreign 
patrons, and for those patrons to convert the requests into 
monetary support by raising funds that then enter the trans-
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national stream of capital. 
Before proceeding, some caveats are in order. First, West-
erners are not the only ones who patronize Tibetan lamas and 
their monasteries in exile. A considerable amount of fund-
ing comes from Taiwan (both from government and private 
sources), and in more recent times from Buddhist communi-
ties in Korea, Japan, Singapore, and Malaysia (Moran 2004; 
Zablocki 2005). The focus on Western patrons is prompted 
by the explicit connection they often make between chari-
table giving and cultural preservation, an ideology that sets 
them apart from benefactors in other countries. Second, for 
the purpose of simplifying the analysis, this paper centers ex-
clusively on monks. Nuns are excluded for practical and de-
mographic reasons [I have better data on monks, and monks 
outnumber nuns nine to one in the Tibetan exile population 
(Planning Council 2000:215)]. Third, I have created what 
many will consider a false dichotomy between Buddhist mo-
nasticism and village-level religious practices, a gross simpli-
ﬁcation that glosses over the historical, syncretistic processes 
that have shaped Tibetan religion over the course of centu-
ries (see Kapstein 2000). My justiﬁcation for doing so is that 
a degree of generalization is necessary to make some of my 
points, and hope that it will not prove to be too much of a 
distraction. Finally, a methodological clariﬁcation is in order. 
I am using the internet as a source of data. Unlike printed 
publications, web sites are ephemeral. Between writing the 
initial (2002) and ﬁnal (2005) editions of this essay many 
of the web sites quoted herein have changed their contents. 
Therefore, the reader will have to take it on trust that I am 
accurately citing the postings from previous times.
WESTERN VISIONS OF TIBETAN   
BUDDHIST SOCIETY
Westerners have been selective when it comes to 
understanding and portraying Tibetan society (Bishop 1990; 
Lopez 1998), being far more captivated by the esoteric, 
philosophical dimensions of Buddhism than by village-
level religious practices. Not only were Buddhism and “folk 
religion” analytically separated in earlier academic writings 
(Hoffman 1975; Tucci 1980), these days most primers on 
Tibetan religion present the histories and philosophies 
of the major Buddhist sects while ignoring altogether the 
folk traditions (e.g., Powers 1995; Thurman 1995; Ray 
2002; Newman 2004; c.f. Samuel 1993). To be fair, these 
books are about Tibetan Buddhism, not about syncretistic 
religious practices in a Tibetan social context. Nevertheless, 
I suspect that the tendency to focus on normative aspects of 
monastic Buddhism can be partially explained by a common 
refrain one hears among Western Buddhists, namely, that 
“Buddhism is a philosophy, not a religion”. Adopting such 
a perspective allows one to relegate many religious practices 
to the periphery since they are not “Buddhist” and hence 
are of little relevance. Obviously, rituals meant to propitiate 
malevolent forces that threaten crops or bovines have no 
applicability in the life of a suburban-dwelling Western 
disciple. 
Tibetan exiles are also active agents in propagating spe-
ciﬁc images of their society for strategic purposes (Huber 
2001). They are adept at “deploying” a vision of their culture 
to mobilize political support (McLagan 1997), including the 
viewpoint that certain monastic-based rituals beneﬁt all of 
humanity (Schrempf 1997). Prodded by the favorable recep-
tion that they have received in the West, Tibetans now help 
disseminate the equation that normative monastic Buddhism 
equals Tibetan culture. 
The task of perpetuating the above equation is now ful-
ﬁlled—whether consciously or not—by people whose views 
carry considerable weight with the general public, including 
leaders of the Tibetan exile community and Western sup-
porters of Tibetan causes.  For example, the Tibetan Gov-
ernment-in-Exile’s ofﬁcial web site contains a section titled 
“Tibetan Culture” (www.tibet.com, viewed 6/05). The vast 
majority of essays focus on religious leaders and the monas-
tic tradition.  Tibet House Trust, a Tibetan charity inaugu-
rated by the Dalai Lama, states as an objective “to preserve 
Tibetan identity and culture.”  Under “cultural activities”, the 
organization listed a Buddhist seminar in London and spon-
sorships for monks and nuns (www.tibet.com/Trust/trust, 
viewed 2/02). The Students for a Free Tibet web page used 
to contain a blurb on “Tibetan Culture” that was exclusively 
devoted to the teachings of Sakyamuni (www.tibet.org.sft, 
viewed 2/02). The Amitabha Foundation, a non-proﬁt orga-
nization dedicated to “preserving and promoting the unique 
beauty of Tibetan culture while providing for the needs of 
Tibetan refugees living in exile,” asserted on their web page 
that,
Tibetan culture is inextricably intertwined with Buddhist 
forms. Indeed, it is impossible to effectively introduce Tibetan 
culture to an American audience without presenting Buddhist 
ceremony or philosophy.
(www.amitabhafoundation.org, viewed 2/02)
Finally, Tibet House, a well-endowed organization in New 
York patronized by some high-proﬁle public ﬁgures, runs a 
Tibetan Studies Program. In 2002 their stated goal was, 
[To] develop a comprehensive overview of the insights, ex-
periences and practices essential to understanding the Ti-
betan world view. It is divided into three modules: the yoga 
of ordinary living; women and Buddhism in the West; and 
the transformative relationship in spiritual development and 
psychotherapy. In addition, there is a workshop exploring the 
intertwined nature of faith, meditation and practice in Bud-
dhism today, and a second workshop on the spiritual problem 
of giving yourself away (www.tibethouse.org, viewed 2/02).
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These are just a sampling of perspectives that help shape 
the Western imagination about Tibetan culture. The message 
they propagate is that monastic Buddhism and its esoteric 
teachings represent the essence of Tibetan culture; every-
thing else is peripheral. Monasteries and religious education 
have unquestionably been cornerstones of Tibetan society 
for centuries—that point is beyond debate. As highly visible 
institutions possessing considerable prestige (the clergy was 
situated at the apex of the social hierarchy) and power (po-
litical might was wielded through the control over produc-
tive resources), monasteries occupied a preeminent position 
within Tibetan society. Their role in shaping Tibetan culture 
has been profound, yet monasteries represent only one as-
pect of Tibetan religion: they did not have a monopoly on 
the spiritual life of the communities they dominated. Village 
religious practices, characterized by one scholar as having a 
“pragmatic orientation” (Samuel 1993), centered on a pletho-
ra of deities inhabiting the natural environment. Lay people 
devoted a great deal of time and energy to placating these 
deities, arguably far more so than listening to sermons by 
lamas or studying Buddhist scripture (prior to recent times 
most Tibetans were illiterate). 
Similarly, an inescapable lesson deriving from my long-
term ﬁeldwork in the ethnically Tibetan enclave of Nubri 
(Gorkha District, Nepal—until the 1850s a part of rDzong-
dga’ District in Tibet) is that a Tibetan religious system in-
volves far more than monasteries and monks (Childs 2004). 
I refer to it as a religious system, since the entirety of rit-
ual and spiritual life relies on several specialists operating 
within a well-delineated division of labor. Nubri has a few 
celibate monks (dge-slong) who spend much of their time 
delving into the most esoteric teachings and practices, while 
also dispensing spiritual advice to community members. 
Meanwhile, lineage lamas (sngags-pa) perform ceremonies to 
accomplish mundane objectives such as warding off bovine 
pestilence, assuring the longevity of a patron, removing the 
pollution associated with childbirth, or dispelling hidden 
forces that cause illness. The pha-jo (similar to the bon-po and 
lha-bon elsewhere) is responsible for making offerings to the 
local protector deity (yul-lha) in order to maintain harmony 
between the villagers and the natural elements, while the as-
trologer (rtsis-pa) composes natal horoscopes for every child 
that is born and calculates auspicious days for weddings and 
funerals. Many laymen are labeled mchod-pa, part-time prac-
titioners with rudimentary liturgical training who mainly 
participate in communal rituals. Nuns (a-ni jo-mo) occupy 
a socially ambiguous position since their familial function 
as caretakers for aging parents is valued more highly than 
their role as ritual participants (see also Gutschow 2004). 
The diverse religious practitioners function as a team, each 
recognizing his or her sphere of authority and not encroach-
ing upon the domains of the others. Villagers do not con-
ceptualize a dichotomy between Buddhist and non-Buddhist 
liturgical practices, preferring instead to view all aspects of 
their religious system as an interdependent whole. In this re-
gard Nubri is by no means unique, as attested by the ethno-
graphic literature on the Himalayan region (see for example 
Clarke 1980; Holmberg 1989; Mumford 1989; Ramble 1990; 
Diemberger 1992). 
In places such as Nubri, Yolmo (Clarke 1980), and until 
recently Khumbu (Ortner 1989), monasteries populated by 
celibate monks are less central to religious life than commu-
nal temples presided over by married lamas. The predomi-
nance of Nyingmapa afﬁliation no doubt helps explain the 
way that religion is integrated within Nepal’s highland soci-
eties. Celibate monasteries do exist, but compared to Tibet 
are rare, less prominent in the socioeconomic realm, and in 
many places are newcomers that were established during the 
twentieth century. The Sherpas, for example, built their ﬁrst 
monastery for celibate monks less than one hundred years 
ago (Ortner 1989). In short, the social organization of reli-
gion in the ethnically Tibetan communities of Nepal is quite 
different from the representation of Tibetan Buddhist society 
that is popular in the West. 
China’s repressive rule in Tibet led to the ﬂight of some 
of Tibet’s most eminence lamas to Nepal and India. They 
were accompanied by thousands of lay people, including 
many who specialized in the performance of “non-Buddhist” 
rituals. Once in exile these latter individuals found a dimin-
ished role to play in society. For one, the preponderance of 
their rituals was intimately tied to the landscapes of their 
ancestral homelands. How can one propitiate a yul-lha if the 
mountain abode of that deity lays across the Himalayan mas-
sif in Tibet?  Vestiges of village religion that have managed 
to survive are often denigrated. Recall, for example, how the 
astrologer in Khyentse Norbu’s ﬁlm The Cup was portrayed as 
a drunken, disheveled, malodorous buffoon. One man who 
used to specialize in propitiating protective local deities in-
formed me that clerics in exile have discouraged him from 
performing his rituals. Unlike village-based practices which 
have withered to the point of non-existence, monastic Bud-
dhism could be disengaged from the surrounding landscape 
and continues to enjoy a prestigious position in exile society. 
Resurrection is proof of its adaptability. As a result, visitors 
to the Tibetan communities of Nepal and India can easily 
come away with the impression that monastic Buddhism is, 
and always has been, the centerpiece of Tibetan religious 
culture. It therefore seems natural to equate support for such 
institutions with the preservation of Tibetan culture. 
THE NATURE OF PATRONAGE 
Most monasteries in pre-1959 Tibet were supported by their 
land holdings, or more accurately, by the peasants who 
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farmed monastery lands and performed corvée labor in 
exchange for a stipulated portion of the produce and other 
rights (Carrasco 1959; Surkhang 1986). For example, during 
the reign of the Fifth Dalai Lama (late 1600s), Drepung 
monastery’s population of 4,200 monks was sustained by 
553 lay households (Dung-dkar 1991:74). Members of those 
households did not fund the monastery through voluntary 
donations. Rather, their support was part of a contractual 
agreement between the owners of the land (Drepung) and 
the peasants, the majority of whom were born into positions 
of servitude to the monastery. 
The resurgence of Tibet’s monasteries in exile was contin-
gent upon ﬁnding new sources of funding. As refugees they 
could not replicate the land tenure system that previously 
existed in Tibet, but as Klieger (1991) argues, Tibetans have 
successfully invoked a traditional priest-patron relationship 
(chos-yon) to derive beneﬁts from their interactions with 
foreigners. By the mid 1990s there were an estimated 45 
Tibetan monasteries scattered about the Kathmandu Valley 
(Frechette 2004:111). The primary means of support came 
through Western patronage. According to Frechette,
Tibetan Lamas, according to one estimate [source of esti-
mate not revealed], can earn as much as $40,000 to $60,000 
through just one tour of the U.S. or Europe. When they estab-
lish dharma centers (teaching centers) in the U.S. or Europe, 
they create a more continuous source of foreign funds. Accord-
ing to one source [derived from Coleman 1993], 77 percent of 
all Tibetan lamas in exile have traveled to the U.S. or Europe, 
and 51 percent have emigrated to Europe, the U.S., Canada, 
Australia or New Zealand to resettle in dharma centers. They 
use the foreign donations they solicit through their tours and 
dharma centers to ﬁnance their monasteries in Nepal and In-
dia (2004:111-112).
From an early date some Westerners equated support for 
Tibetan monasteries with the preservation of Tibetan cul-
ture. According to one perspective,
The ﬁrst Americans to work for the survival of Tibetan culture 
were originally attracted to Buddhist philosophy. Through 
contact with Buddhist forms they came to work for Tibetan 
survival. These people remain the backbone for western support 
Children with photo of Dalai Lama PHOTO: TED SAVAGE
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of the Tibetans’ struggle to preserve their threatened traditions. 
(www.amithabafoundation.org, viewed 2/02)
Today, a recurrent refrain among monasteries in exile and 
the Western organizations that sustain them is that support-
ing monks is a means to safeguarding Tibetan culture. The 
internet has become an important source for spreading the 
message and soliciting funds to accomplish this objective. 
For example, 
The Drepung Loseling Educational Fund was established in 
1988 to preserve traditional Tibetan culture by sponsoring a 
monk in training at Drepung Loseling. (http://www.drepung.
org, viewed 6/05)
Kopan Monastery, home of a very popular meditation 
course for foreign visitors to Nepal, made the appeal, “Help 
save Tibetan culture: sponsor a Tibetan monk or nun” (www.
kopan-monastery.com, viewed 2/02). A monastery in India 
requests, 
To assist Drepung Gomang Monastery in its mission to educate 
and train monks in the Buddhist philosophy of wisdom and 
compassion and to prevent the extinction of the culture of Ti-
bet, we ask that you sponsor a monk at the monastery (www.
gomang.org, viewed 6/05)
Another historically signiﬁcant institution makes the fol-
lowing appeal:
Gyuto Tantric University in India is one of the few remaining 
places where the ancient, sacred Tibetan teachings are avail-
able. Therefore, many young men continue to risk their lives to 
journey over the boarder from Tibet to India, to join the monks 
and become one of their number. Your donation will not only 
help support a Gyuto monk - it will help preserve these ancient 
practices as well. (www.gyuto.va.com.au, viewed 6/05)
Organizations in the West make similar petitions. Tibetan 
Monastery, based in New York City, with the mission “to 
preserve the unique spiritual wisdom and cultural heritage 
of Tibet through providing a wide range of programs on 
Buddhism and Tibetan culture”, is a conduit for sponsoring 
a monk or nun (www.tibetanmonstery.com, viewed 2/02). 
Similarly, the Tibetan Sponsorship Project states, “Our vi-
sion is to see the Tibetan religion and culture remain alive 
and ﬂourish.”  One of their methods for accomplishing this 
objective is to fund a monk (www.tibetaid.org, viewed 2/02). 
The newsletter of a Buddhist organization in the U.S. dis-
closes the amount of funding that they sent to their lama’s 
monastery, then states, “Through this effort, each sponsor 
helps these young monks in the process of studying and 
preserving the precious Dharma, as well as their Tibetan 
culture” (www.kurukulla.org, viewed 6/05). Similarly, one 
particular solicitation for sponsorship argues: 
The Monks are of vital importance to the progress of Bud-
dhism. The monks are the major source and labor behind the 
preservation of the Tibetan language, culture, dance rituals, 
prayers and practices, written language (Sanskrit) and holy 
traditions and transmissions brought from India by the most 
excellent master Padmasambhava. (www. ripaladrang.org, 
viewed 6/05)
Finally, one organization entreats,
Help these young people [i.e., the monks pictured on the web 
site] to inherit the richness of their own culture. This is a rare 
opportunity to preserve a vital link for future generations 
(www.shechen.org, viewed 6/05).
The above citations represent a mere sample of sponsor-
ing organizations. Others do not make the explicit claim 
that supporting a monk is synonymous with saving Tibetan 
culture. Nevertheless, they still transmit this very message, 
at least implicitly, by including a history section outlining 
the rise of Buddhist monasticism in Tibet, its demise un-
der Chinese rule in Tibet, and its resurrection in exile. The 
accompanying claims of “cultural genocide” leave no doubt 
that providing support for an exile monastery is akin to pre-
serving Tibet’s cultural heritage. 
MONASTIC PATRONAGE:     
A STIMULUS FOR MIGRATION
Hypothesis 1: The recent proliferation of exile monasteries, sup-
ported in part by foreign patrons, has increased the demand 
for monks. The rapid fertility decline among Tibetan exiles has 
stimulated the intensiﬁcation of recruitment efforts in Nepal’s 
Buddhist highlands, resulting in an unprecedented level of out-
migration of young males.
When exile monasteries were few in number the refugees 
could be counted on to ﬁll the ranks by producing an ad-
equate supply of children. As recently as 1987 the exiles’ 
Total Fertility Rate (the average number of children who 
would be born to each woman in a population if age-spe-
ciﬁc fertility rates remain constant) exceeded six births per 
woman (Childs et. al. 2005). As monasteries began to prolif-
erate their supply of monks was reinforced by a new wave of 
refugees. During the 1980s China’s relaxing of restrictions 
on religion in Tibet was followed by crackdowns that forced 
many novice monks to ﬂee across the Himalayas where they 
were absorbed into the exile monasteries. Laymen who es-
caped Tibet further swelled the ranks when persuaded by 
resettlement ofﬁcials to become monks on the grounds that 
they would gain education and social status, not to mention 
food and shelter in an alien land, and would consequently be 
less of a burden on society. 
Meanwhile, major demographic changes were underway. 
Exile fertility plummeted from over six births per woman 
in 1987 to less than two births per woman by 2000 (Childs 
et. al. 2005). Those sons who were born to refugee parents 
during the fertility transition were not likely to be designated 
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monks. Through interviews with young couples in Kath-
mandu and Dharamsala, I learned that most prefer secular 
education over monasticism for their children, believing that 
the decision to become a monk should be a matter of individ-
ual volition rather than parental prerogative. Secular educa-
tion is now nearly universal among exiles. According to 1998 
statistics 94% of exile children aged 5-16 in India and Nepal 
were currently being educated in schools and monasteries. 
Among those, the vast majority (96%) were in secular schools 
(Planning Council 2000). 
A forty-year emphasis on 
secular education has led 
to a transformation in the 
value that exiles place on 
monastic education. One 
young man stated (and 
claimed this to be a com-
mon sentiment among 
people of his cohort) that 
monasticism is a lesser 
option in life that is only 
ﬁtting for those who fail 
to thrive in school, or 
who show little aptitude 
for business. 
The fertility decline 
and attitudinal changes 
have caused a dramatic 
reduction in the number 
of monks that the refugees are now able—or willing—to 
supply to the exile monasteries, thereby instigating a shift 
in recruitment strategies. According to the testimony of one 
lama who heads several monasteries and convents in Nepal,
During the time of the decrease in my merit, the Buddha 
Dharma in the land of snow (Tibet) was diminishing. This was 
especially the fate of [name of monastery] . . . At that time I 
became a refugee and did not know where to go. During this 
time of hardship, having the motivation to keep my monastery 
alive, I purchased a small piece of land in front of the Great 
Stupa of Boudhanath in Kathmandu, Nepal and built a small 
monastery, which I named [name of monastery]. After build-
ing the monastery in Boudha, it was difﬁcult to ﬁnd children 
who wanted to become monks. I decided to ask some people 
I knew about ﬁnding children who wished to be monks. They 
said, “Nowadays all people want to go to school and study or 
to do business and earn much money. It’s almost impossible to 
ﬁnd children to become monks.” After hearing this, I was very 
depressed and disappointed but nevertheless I made a fruit-
ful aspiration with good motivation and put many Chakras 
(mandalas) of the Sangha and Harmony of the Sangha into 
the main Buddha statue of the monastery. As a result of that, 
[person’s name] became the ﬁrst monk from Nupri Village 
[Nubri Valley], Gorkha [District], Nepal. Eventually the num-
ber of monks grew and ﬂourished and soon there were almost 
as many monks as in the monastery in Tibet. (www.rinpoche.
com/Nupri/englishletter.htm, viewed 6/05)
Today, the preponderance of recruitment efforts centers 
on children from the ethnically Tibetan borderlands of Ne-
pal and India. Go to any Tibetan monastery in Boudhanath 
and ask junior monks to state their place of origin. You will 
ﬁnd that the vast majority are ethnic Tibetans from Nubri, 
Tsum, Mustang, and Dolpo, Sherpas from Solu-Khumbu, 
Tamangs from Rasuwa 
District, and so forth. 
You will be hard pressed 
to ﬁnd anybody under 
age ﬁfteen who was born 
in Kathmandu to refugee 
parents. 
The persistence of high 
fertility makes these ar-
eas productive grounds 
for recruitment. The To-
tal Fertility Rate (TFR) in 
the highlands of Nepal 
(4.8 births per woman) is 
higher than in the middle 
hills (4.0) or terai (4.1) 
(Ministry of Health, New 
ERA, and ORC Macro 
2002: 56). TFRs for vil-
lages in Nubri range 
from 5.3 to 7.0 births per 
woman (Childs 2001). Bear in mind that these ﬁgures repre-
sent an average that is mitigated by religious celibacy, infertil-
ity, and premature sterility. It is not uncommon for married 
women to give birth to ten or more children, albeit the ex-
tremely high level of infant and childhood mortality reduces 
the number of offspring who reach maturity. Nevertheless, 
because mortality declines often precede fertility declines, 
many highland areas of Nepal where monks are now being 
recruited may be experiencing rapid population growth. Al-
though no site-speciﬁc studies from the highlands exist to 
conﬁrm this suspicion, aggregate data on the northernmost 
districts of Nepal suggests a signiﬁcant decline in under-ﬁve 
mortality (i.e., infant plus childhood mortality) occurred be-
tween 1996 and 2001 [from 208 deaths per 1000 live births 
to 157 deaths per 1000 live births (Pradhan et. al. 1997:104; 
Ministry of Health, New ERA, and ORC Macro 2002:131]. If 
this is the case, then parents are confronting the reality that 
more of their children are surviving to maturity.
In Nubri, dispatching a son to reside in one of Kathman-
du’s monasteries has emerged as an important post-natal 
option for parents to manage the size and composition of 
their families. The decision is based on a combination of cul-
tural and economic rationales. The cultural incentive is that 
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parents and their son accrue blessings (sbyin-rlabs) and good 
fortune (bsod-lde).  From an economic perspective, sending 
a son away removes him from the inheritance equation. Lo-
cal regulations stipulate that no more than two brothers can 
marry a single wife, thereby placing limits on polyandry as 
an option parents can use to manage their assets over time. 
All sons have an equal entitlement to claim their inheritance 
at marriage. Therefore, if there are three sons in a family and 
none are monks, then the estate must be divided into at least 
two portions. Sending one son away to be a monk and con-
tracting a polyandrous marriage for the other two ensures 
that the family assets will be transferred intact to the next 
generation.
Removing a son from the household also shifts the cost 
of his upbringing from the parents to the religious institu-
tion, or more accurately, to foreign patrons. This beneﬁt is 
not lost on parents. Although the people of Nubri are by no 
means threatened by starvation, their economic fortunes can 
wax and wane as a result of political decisions beyond their 
control, for example the prohibiting or permitting of trade 
of dbyar-rtsa dgun-’bu (cordyceps sinensis, a medicinal herb), 
or China’s decisions to close the border in response to out-
breaks of hoof and mouth disease. Throw in the usual haz-
ards such as winter avalanches that can decimate one’s herd, 
late snows and frosts that can doom a crop, or the death of 
a young and productive worker in the family, and one can 
begin to appreciate the degree of uncertainly that plagues 
families in Nubri. Sending a son to the secure conﬁnes of a 
monastery is a form of risk reduction. 
Finally, once a talented monk comes of age he can gar-
ner a substantial income by giving teachings or performing 
rituals for afﬂuent refugees and Western patrons. Personal 
relationships with the latter can also result in sponsorships 
dispensed as occasional gifts or monthly stipends. Some of 
this cash returns as remunerations to parents back in their 
highland villages. Although I have no data detailing levels of 
such remunerations, I have heard parents in Nubri compar-
ing notes with each other about the amount of money their 
sons send back each year.
Sending a son away to be a monk is a long-term, house-
hold-level, economic diversiﬁcation strategy. Contrary to 
common assumption, sending sons from Nubri to Tibetan 
monasteries does not necessarily represent continuity with 
tradition—at least not in terms of the sheer numbers of 
children who are sent these days. Prior to 1959 a few men 
from Nubri resided in Tibetan monasteries, most notably at 
nearby Dagkar Taso (Brag-dkar rTa-so) situated to the north 
of Kyirong. However, a proper monastic education entailed 
signiﬁcant donations by parents, which presumably acted as 
a disincentive. The situation has been changed by the pro-
liferation of exile monasteries and the subsidies provided 
for monks by foreign patrons; the cost to parents has been 
signiﬁcantly reduced (in fact, there is often no cost). By 1997, 
the year I conducted a demographic survey, roughly 30% of 
all male children in some Nubri villages were living in the 
monasteries of Kathmandu and India. One man recently la-
mented that there are virtually no children between the ages 
of ﬁve and ﬁfteen remaining in his village. Such a high level 
of monastic out-migration is unprecedented in Nubri, and is 
bound to have implications for all aspects of society.
CULTURE CHANGE IN THE NAME OF 
CULTURAL PRESERVATION
Hypothesis 2: The goal of preserving Tibetan culture is a ratio-
nale for Westerners to support Tibetan exile monasteries. An 
unintended consequence of foreign patronage for these monas-
teries is the loss of cultural diversity in the ethnically Tibetan, 
Buddhist highlands of Nepal. 
The second hypothesis seems counterintuitive. As estab-
lished above, patronizing religious institutions is endorsed 
by Tibetans and their Western supporters as a primary 
means for preserving—not transforming—Tibetan culture. 
The mere presence of monastic institutions in exile is cited as 
tangible evidence that Tibetan culture is alive and thriving, 
and in this regard foreign patronage has deﬁnitely contrib-
uted to the perseverance of Tibetan culture. However, the 
second hypothesis concerns the ripple effects of patronage 
that radiate outward from Kathmandu, in particular, the 
unanticipated cultural transformations occurring in the in-
digenous Tibetan communities of highland Nepal that trace 
their roots to the resurgence of monasticism in exile. 
Subsidies for monks draw many highland children to 
Kathmandu’s monasteries, a process that can be character-
ized as a rural “brain drain”. The sheer quantity of migra-
tion signiﬁcantly reduces the pool of young men who might 
otherwise have aspired to village-based religious vocations 
(e.g., bon-po or rtsis-pa). Furthermore, one must consider the 
quality of those children who are sent. In an African setting 
anthropologist Caroline Bledsoe has documented the criteria 
parents use to assess the personal attributes of their offspring 
and determine which of a family’s scarce resources should 
be devoted to the upbringing of each child. The strategic in-
tent is to maximize each child’s potential to contribute to 
the household through the development of social networks, 
economic assistance from paid employment, and so forth 
(Bledsoe 1990). Similarly, parents in Nubri are aware that 
talented and properly educated monks can reap signiﬁcant 
monetary rewards. It is thereby safe to assume that parents 
do not send sons at random to the monastery. Elsewhere I 
have noted that children smitten with disabilities are often 
designated to be village-resident monks (Childs 2004:70-71). 
However, sending a disabled son to a monastery presided 
over by a revered rinpoche is considered inappropriate. Do 
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parents send their most intellectually gifted children to the 
monasteries?  If so, their actions would amplify the intensity 
of the brain drain.
Children from rural areas of Nepal who are raised and 
educated in urban environments often develop a disdain for 
their natal villages (dirty, undeveloped, no modern ameni-
ties) and the villagers they left behind (uneducated, uncouth, 
and unclean), a process that is integrally tied with the dis-
course on development (see Des Chene 1996). In terms of 
religious orientations, a cultural divide also arises between 
those who are educated and think of themselves as modern, 
and those rural-dwellers whom they characterize as being 
“backwards” and “igno-
rant” (Bista 1991; see also 
Pigg 1996). In terms of 
religious orientations, a 
cultural divide also arises 
between young men who 
are raised at prestigious 
institutions in Kathman-
du and those who remain 
in the villages. Upon 
returning home they en-
counter religious practic-
es that do not accord with 
what they have learned in 
the monasteries. I have 
spoken with monks who 
disparage local religious 
practices on the grounds 
that they are corrupt and 
degenerate [some most 
certainly are, from a nor-
mative Buddhist perspec-
tive, e.g., animal sacriﬁce 
(Childs 1997)]. Further-
more, monks who return 
home are accorded places 
of honor due to their vo-
cation, education, and 
status as disciples of great 
masters. Therefore, one 
can expect their opinions on religious matters to hold much 
sway, especially as they become older and gain inﬂuence. 
The question remains, do returning monks instigate changes 
by trying to replicate the monastic systems in which they 
spent their formative years?
Some monks from the highlands of Nepal have reached 
maturity and now occupy senior administrative and liturgi-
cal positions within the exile monasteries of Kathmandu and 
India. As potential gatekeepers, they are placed in an ideal 
position to interact with their lama’s Western disciples. Sev-
eral have even accompanied their lamas on teaching tours to 
Buddhist centers throughout the Western world. Education, 
aptitude, and exposure to Western disciples can help a monk 
forge personal contacts. Following the precedence set by 
their own lamas, these contacts can translate into support for 
new monastic initiatives back in their highland villages, akin 
to a process described by Ramble concerning relationships 
between tourists and indigenous Himalayan communities. 
And now there is the Third Diffusion [of Buddhism], originat-
ing in the exile community. . . . The burgeoning international 
interest in the Tibetan cause has less to do with a sporting 
sympathy for the underdog than with a real appreciation of the 
universal relevance of Tibetan Buddhism. But the Third Spread 
is not limited to the ﬁrst-world public undergoing a spiritual 
crisis. It is also reaching the Tibetan-speaking people of the 
Himalayan rimland. How?
The common enough scenario is that a businessman from, 
say, Japan, United States or Taiwan becomes impassioned by 
the Tibetan cause and goes trekking in the Himalaya. Because 
he has Tibet on his mind, what he sees is a Tibetan culture 
apparently fallen into decline: a struggling language, illiterate 
monks, dilapidated temples, and a degenerate Lamaist tradi-
tion. With the blessing of his lama (who probably has never 
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been to this place), he elects to help the area by building a 
monastery. No objection, naturally, from the locals, who have 
not to examine the gift horse too closely. To the outsider, at 
least, the act looks like the commendable resuscitation of a 
failing Buddhist heritage. (Ramble 1993:25)
Add to the trekking “businessman” another type of per-
son, “Western Buddhist”—one who is already enamored by 
Tibetan religion and especially the monastic traditions—and 
you have parallel recipes for inducing culture change. On 
the one hand monks who return to their villages are in a 
good position to solicit donations from tourists to support 
religious institutions. In places like Nubri, monks educated 
in exile institutions are often the only locals who possess a 
solid command of the English language. Their red robes are 
the visible symbol of Buddhist culture that foreigners yearn 
to encounter on their treks to the highlands, so they are 
well situated to act as mediums for the support that Ramble 
alludes to. On the other hand, I have encountered many 
Western Buddhists who view the Himalayan hinterlands as 
cultural backwaters, places where an infusion of monastic 
institutions can reverse their relapsing tendencies and return 
them to less adulterated forms of religious practice and social 
organization. According to such a world view, the Himala-
yan borderlands occupy an intermediary ground between 
the pure land of Tibet where religion has been eradicated 
and the resurrected monasteries in exile where the traditions 
are being preserved. Transposing the monastic template 
to indigenous Tibetan communities of Nepal is considered 
both compassionate and progressive. Monks educated in ex-
ile monasteries, in particular those who have risen in the 
monastic hierarchy and have foreign contacts, are the logical 
conduits through which such a process can be facilitated.
A new monastery is now nearing completion in Nubri. 
Funding is provided by a well-endowed institution in India, 
which in turn is patronized by scores of devotees from the 
West. The point-men for construction are three mkhan-bu 
(disciples of the main monastery’s abbot), two of whom are 
thirty year-old monks who were born in Nubri and sent to 
South India while youths. When the monastery opens in the 
summer of 2006 it is expected to be populated by ﬁfty or 
so monks who are presently undergoing training in South 
India. Their return will partially offset the out-migration 
stimulated by monastic recruitment. In addition, their as-
cent of the local religious hierarchy will inevitably transform 
ritual practices and social structures that have evolved in situ 
over the centuries.
Chyodi Gompa in Lo Manthang (Mustang) Nepal PHOTO: NANCY GREEN
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
I began with the provocative hypotheses that foreign 
attempts to preserve Tibetan culture have stimulated 
demographic and cultural transformation in the ethnically 
Tibetan borderlands of Nepal. Contributions by Western 
patrons to exile monasteries have provided critical support 
for a monastic revival, which in turn has generated a rising 
demand for new recruits. Meanwhile, the decline of fertility 
among Tibetan exiles has shifted the primary recruiting 
grounds from the refugee camps to the highlands of Nepal 
where high fertility combined with household level economic 
concerns offer compelling incentives to send children away 
from the village. The parents are in a win-win situation: they 
achieve religious merit, eliminate a son from the inheritance 
equation, transfer the cost of raising and educating that child 
to others, and can expect future remunerations. Foreign 
patronage for exile monasteries is thereby directly responsible 
for an unprecedented level of out-migration of youths from 
their native highlands. These individuals subsequently 
become instigators of culture change once they return as 
fully-ordained monks. Some foreign patrons envision this as 
a positive development, guided in their sentiments by the 
belief that Buddhist societies of Nepal’s highlands—as in 
Tibet—are properly constituted with celibate monasteries 
occupying their focal points. In a personal conversation 
about monks returning from Kathmandu to build the new 
monastery in Nubri, one Western disciple declared, “They 
[returning monks] will be bringing the Dharma back to their 
homes.”  Perhaps this person does not realize that Buddhism 
is already well entrenched in Nubri, albeit not in a form that 
revolves around celibate monasticism. Perhaps this person 
interprets the dearth of monastic institutions and celibate 
monks to mean that Nubri society has degenerated from 
an archetypal Tibetan cultural template. If so, then actions 
meant to resuscitate a “failing Buddhist heritage” have the 
inadvertent effect of propelling indigenous Buddhist practices 
and social structures to the periphery, and perhaps toward 
extinction. Ergo, culture change is occurring as a direct 
result of efforts geared toward cultural preservation. 
  This essay is not meant to be an indictment against Tibet’s 
monastic tradition, which has proven to be remarkably 
resilient and adaptive to new circumstances. Nor do I mean 
to disparage Western patrons whose actions have undeniably 
assisted in the preservation of Buddhist teachings, many 
of which were threatened with extinction but are now 
being transmitted to a new generation of guardians. 
Beneﬁciaries, such as Tibetan exiles and parents in Nubri, 
have few objections against the patronage received by their 
religious institutions (c.f. Frechette 2004: 112-117) or the 
new opportunities for managing their family compositions 
and household economics arising from that patronage. 
Furthermore, this essay should not be read as a lament about 
cultural changes that are now occurring throughout the 
Himalayan highlands. With respect to the nature of societies, 
I subscribe to the Buddhist viewpoint on impermanence (i.e., 
change is natural and inevitable), which renders problematic 
the very concept of “cultural preservation”. As one scholar 
contends,
Tibetan culture, like any other, is dynamic; calling for its 
‘preservation’ automatically brings forth the need for it to be 
deﬁned, and this in turn leads to a stuffed-and-mounted item 
ﬁt for a museum (Sperling 2000).
Here I need to conclude on a clear note: this is a theoreti-
cal essay about potential (and perhaps actual) consequences 
stemming from the encounter between Tibetan lamas and 
their Western patrons. Some of the evidence to support my 
arguments is incontrovertible (e.g., fertility trends; solicita-
tions for supporting monasteries are couched in terms of sav-
ing Tibetan culture). On the other hand, the diligent reader 
will certainly notice, and perhaps be perturbed by, the fact 
that some key arguments are not substantiated by reliable 
data, or are supported by anecdotal evidence. Although some 
parts of the thesis might sound convincing, and other parts 
might seem intuitively obvious, there is much that can be—
and should be—subjected to critical scrutiny. A theoretical 
essay is no substitute for diligent research, and therefore I 
set forth the preceding arguments so that they can be evalu-
ated, and then either accepted, reﬁned, or rejected in light 
of empirical evidence. If this essay manages to nudge the 
discourse on culture change toward hitherto under-explored 
directions, then my goal to stimulate a more rigorous analy-
sis of transnational processes in the Himalayan region will 
be fulﬁlled.
ENDNOTES
 1Revised edition (June 2005), for HIMALAYA. In 2001 I re-
ceived a letter from a teacher in Nubri, Nepal, who lamented that 
his school was ﬂoundering because parents were sending the ma-
jority of their children to monasteries in Kathmandu and India. 
This prompted me to write an e-mail rant to a friend, which was 
forwarded (without my knowledge or permission, but in retrospect 
it was a serendipitous act) and continued to make the rounds until 
it crossed the desk of Barbara Brower. I am indebted to Barbara 
for encouraging me to convert some unfocused thoughts into an 
exploratory essay, which was completed in 2002. A delay in publi-
cation prompted me to include an abridged version of this essay’s 
arguments in another publication (Childs 2004:68-70). The delay 
also allowed me to thoroughly revise the paper after returning to 
Nubri in May of 2005 for the ﬁrst time in nearly ﬁve years.
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